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Generalized Trust in the Mirror. An Agent-Based 
Model on the Dynamics of Trust 
Dominik Klein & Johannes Marx ∗ 
Abstract: »Gesellschaftliches Vertrauen in Reflektion. Eine agentenbasierte 
Modellierung von Vertrauensdynamiken.« High levels of trust have been linked 
to a variety of benefits including the well-functioning of markets and political 
institutions or the ability of societies to solve public goods problems endoge-
nously. While there is extensive literature on the macro-level determinants of 
trust, the micro-level processes underlying the emergence and stability of trust 
are not yet sufficiently understood. We address this lacuna by means of a com-
puter model. In this paper, conditions under which trust is likely to emerge and 
be sustained are identified. We focus our analysis mainly on the individual 
characteristics of agents: their social or geographical mobility, their attitude 
towards others or their general uncertainty about the environment. Contrary to 
predictions from previous literature, we show that immobile agents are detri-
mental to both, the emergence and robustness of trust. Additionally, we identi-
fy a hidden link between trusting others and being trustworthy. 
Keywords: Generalized trust, agent-based modeling, social simulation, trust-
game. 
1.  Introduction  
Overcoming collective action problems is a core challenge for large and di-
verse societies. A prominent debate, initiated by Ostrom’s seminal work (1990) 
focuses on the question of when and under which condition collective action 
problems can be solved endogenously, through self-coordination. In this strand 
of literature, trust has been identified as a key determinant for enabling socie-
ties to solve such problems autonomously and efficiently. Moreover, high 
levels of trust have been linked to a variety of social and individual benefits 
including the performance of political institutions (Putnam 2000; Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti 1994), economic capabilities of states (Knack and Keefer 
1997), or health and a better quality of life (Hyyppä 2010). In light of these 
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effects, it comes as no surprise that we find a growing interest in the determi-
nants of trust over recent years. Much effort has been expended identifying a 
range of factors relevant for the emergence and stability of trust. These include 
institutional factors, but also a variety of cultural, societal and individual varia-
bles (Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Kornai, Rothstein and Rose-Ackerman 2004). 
We complement these external determinants with a closer look at the endoge-
nous dynamics of trust or distrust. Far from being a stable phenomenon, trust is 
created through an ongoing complex dynamic process. For once, this process is 
interactive and self-reinforcing: trust creates trust. But how exactly do such 
iterated interactions on the micro-level combine to societal trust? And which 
role do macroscopic factors such as agents’ mobility or their shared cultural 
heritage play in this process? These are the questions we address in this paper. 
That is, we are not only interested in which factors contribute towards the 
emergence or destruction of trust, but also how they do so and how trust and 
distrust sustain. 
We do so by developing an agent-based model in NetLogo (Wilensky 
1999), building on current psychological models as well as insights from the 
social sciences. We see two major advantages in applying computer simulation 
to the emergence and dynamics of trust: 
- First, a computer simulation helps to handle methodological problems in-
herent in empirical research on trust. What might seem tautological – 
trust reinforcing itself – and what might cause methodological problems 
in an empirical study can easily be disentangled with the help of comput-
er simulations, which can also determine at what point in time an indi-
vidual has acquired trust proper, and when her behavior merely reflects 
second or third level considerations. 
- Second, we are interested in the quality of our theoretical knowledge of 
trust. We seek to understand the mechanisms that lead to low or high lev-
els of trust in societies. We therefore build our simulations on well-
established theories of the determinants of trust. Agents’ mobility as well 
as the stability of their surroundings, for example, are held as central in-
fluence factors. But with our simulation we will demonstrate that empiri-
cal results about the direction of these factors’ influence need not always 
be true. Low mobility and stable surroundings might sometimes increase 
trust, but our simulation suggests that this need not always be the case. 
In what follows we will develop and analyze a dynamic model of social trust. 
We will first clarify our notion of trust in Section 2. In Section 3 we introduce 
our model. Section 4 contains an overview of the results, before we conclude in 
Section 5. 
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2.  Theoretical and Empirical Research on Trust 
Trust is a multifaceted concept. In some cases, it can describe the attitude 
among two complete strangers. It can also refer to the relationship between 
good friends. Some authors argue that trust can occur only in actions. Others 
hold that trust refers rather to a belief or attitude. Correspondingly, the current 
literature contains a multitude of theoretical approaches to trust (see for in-
stance Sztompka 1999; Torche and Valenzuela 2011). The literature on social 
capital (Putnam et al. 1994; Uslaner 2002) distinguishes thick and thin notions 
of trust. The former refers to personalized attitudes and expectations towards 
well known, individual others. This thick notion of trust is grounded in a well-
established social relation between the actors, based on acquaintance, joint past 
experience, institutional frames, or expectations of future interaction. The 
emergence of thick trust has been thoroughly studied with various theoretical 
and empirical models as well as computational simulations (Nooteboom, Klos 
and Jorna 2001). The thin notion of trust, conversely, refers to the general 
attitude towards strangers, anonymous and hitherto unknown members of soci-
ety that we might not expect ever to see again. Faced with situations of thin 
trust, agents base their behavior on past experience in similar situations, de-
meanor, appearance or, more general, membership in certain social groups 
(Birk 2001). We are interested here particularly in this second notion of thin or 
generalized trust. 
Other parts of the literature differ in their understanding of what it means to 
trust. One line of research holds that trust is a behavioral concept, that is or 
could be manifested in the actions of some agents. Other approaches argue that 
trust is a cognitive phenomenon, a belief or a family of beliefs. In this paper, 
we focus on a narrow definition of trust, following the latter alternative. We 
take trust as an expectation that may or may not be held by rational agents.1 
More specifically, trust is considered to be an agent’s belief that a randomly 
chosen counterpart will act cooperatively in certain strategic situations. A high 
level of trust is essential for solving cooperation problems that arise in situa-
tions of strategic interdependence. The structure of such a situation can be 
characterized by the following conditions: A resource S is shifted from actor A, 
the trustor, to actor B, the trustee. The trustor’s reason for this shift of resources 
is the hope or expectation to gain from that interaction. However, in shifting 
resources, actor A makes herself vulnerable. She will profit from this interac-
tion only if her counterpart acts cooperatively.  
                                                             
1  In our simulation, there is a close link between trust as a belief and placing trust as a 
behavior. Beliefs about the trustworthiness of some actor will be readily translated into 
some action or non-action towards that actor. 
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Trust games involve a crucial temporal asymmetry. The trustor shifts re-
sources prior to learning about the trustee’s response. The latter, in turn, does 
not need to decide on her behavior until the trustor has moved. If the trustee 
proves trustworthy, both parties receive a positive payoff. However, if the 
trustee turns out untrustworthy only the trustee benefits while the trustor ends 
up with the worst possible payoff. Thus, engaging in trust games is a conscious 
decision under risk. The trustor invests voluntarily and without guaranteed 
success. Furthermore, the trustee’s benefit upon exploiting trust is higher than 
upon rewarding trust. That is, the trustee has no material incentive to act trust-
worthily. Of course, a rational trustor will engage in a trust game only if she 
expects the opponent to be trustworthy. But, given the temporal structure of the 
game, there is no guarantee that the trustee will act as expected. The trustor 
might assess her opponent’s trustworthiness incorrectly, trusting some defector 
or refusing to play with a trustee who would have cooperated. In light of this 
structural uncertainty, a rational trustor will not have all-out beliefs about her 
opponent, judging him trustworthy or untrustworthy tout court. Rather, she will 
engage in some cautious, fine grained considerations, judging the trustee to be 
more or less trustworthy. To accommodate this complexity, we will define trust 
as a graded variable (Coleman 1994, 91-116), reflecting how likely the trustor 
judges her counterpart to be trustworthy. Within the framework of bounded 
rational choice theory, this situation can be represented as a trust game in ex-
tensive form with incomplete information (Buskens 2002). In this framework, 
the trustor’s uncertainty about the trustee’s behavior is represented as uncer-
tainty about her payoff structure, as depicted in Figure 1.2 In this model, uncer-
tainty about the trustee’s motivations is expressed as a draw by nature: With 
probability p, A’s counterpart is not trustworthy, i.e., A will interact with a 
partner with a dominant strategy of defecting. 1 − p is the corresponding likeli-
hood of playing with a trustworthy player, having cooperation as her dominant 
strategy.3  
The central task for the trustor is thus to estimate the likelihood of being 
paired with a trustworthy partner. A trustor will agree to place trust in her 
counterpart if and only if she judges as high enough the chance of his being 
cooperative. In the present simulation, we will concentrate on situations where 
the trustee does not have any specific information about her current counter-
                                                             
2  The payoffs in Figure 1 reflect the all-out utilities governing the agents’ choices. The material 
structure of a trust game (Berg et al. 1995) is usually described with the left side of Figure 1 
having (no-trust, abuse) as unique Nash equilibrium. 
3  Cooperative preferences of the trustee can be motivated by several factors as for example 
social norms, sanctions, reputation, or anticipation of future interactions (Bicchieri, Xiao and 
Muldoon 2011). For our current purposes, the exact reasons or motivations underlying 
the trustee’s behavior are irrelevant. We only need two types of trustees with different domi-
nant strategies. 
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part, other than a general belief about how agents in society behave. We thus 
study the evolution and emergence of generalized trust. 
Figure 1: Trust Game Tree  
 
Trust Game between a trustor A and a trustee B. The utilities satisfy Atr > Ano > Adef for the 
trustor A and B1tr < B1def but B2tr > B2def for the trustee. Trustees in the left branch will exploit 
trust while trustees in the right branch have a dominant strategy of cooperation. 
 
Given that trust is a rational belief held by individuals, it is as yet unclear why 
there are huge differences in the distribution of trust within and between na-
tions. Regarding the determinants of trust, research has identified a variety of 
institutional, economic, social, and personal factors related to high levels of 
trust.4 This literature widely demonstrates that institutional factors in particular 
can explain significant parts of the differences in trust between nation states. 
Next to these institutional explanations, cultural variables such as the level of 
education or the predominant religious conviction have also been linked to 
differences in trust on the macro level. 
However, some observations about trust cannot be accounted for by macro-
scopic variables. Even when cultural and institutional factors are similar, for 
instance within a given country, we still find large differences in the individual 
level of trust. Trust can, for example, differ between neighborhoods within a 
city even though these do not differ in any of the aforementioned institutional 
and cultural factors. It is on such explanations of trust at a local level that we 
focus in this article. 
A further important result from the empirical literature on trust is that gener-
alized trust, once established, is stable (Bjørnskov 2007, 3). A high level of 
trust is maintained, even when some of the relevant macroscopic factors vary. 
In other words: trust stabilizes trust. While Bjørnskov (2007, 1) emphasizes 
                                                             
4  See Bjørnskov (2007), Nannestad (2008), and Welch et al. (2005) for an overview over the 
current literature on determinants of trust. 
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“the importance of taking endogeneity seriously,” a theoretical explanation for 
this pattern is as yet still missing. Or, as Nannestad (2008) puts it: “The ques-
tion of trust is a huge puzzle that is not even near solution.” Obviously there 
must be a mechanism that leads to a lock-in on high or low levels of trust. 
Furthermore, being independent from the relevant institutional, cultural, and 
personal factors, this mechanism must be situated at a micro level. 
In this paper, we present a simulation model that tracks the emergence and 
stability of trust through micro-level behavior. The model is based on a variety 
of meso- and micro-level determinants identified as relevant in the current 
research literature. First, being embedded in stable social surroundings should 
help the agents correctly assess the prospect of trusting. Social context stability 
should thus have a relevant influence on the long term development of trust 
(Coleman 1994). In particular, we expect high mobility to be detrimental to the 
emergence of trust. Second, the level of trust initially existing within a society 
should have an impact on that society’s level of trust, even in the long run. This 
initial trust level is classically understood as a form of cultural heritage, passed 
on from generation to generation by means of socialization. Differences in such 
cultural heritage might arguably explain why some populations display a high 
and stable level of trust and others do not (Putnam et al. 1994). Notably, such 
explanations based on a joint cultural heritage might work on different levels, 
from local neighborhoods up to nation states. And, to state the all too obvious, 
we would, of course, expect a close relation between the average trustworthi-
ness, i.e. the share of trust abusers in the population, and the overall trust level. 
3.  Description of the Model 
The present model’s core is formed by trust games played between a trustor 
and a trustee.5 Each pair of agents will play only a single trust game, before 
both parties involved move forward to engage with new partners. Over time, 
each agent can assume both roles, sometimes acting as trustor and sometimes 
as trustee. Crucially, in both of these roles, the agent can gather new infor-
mation about the prospects of trust. We describe the behavior of agents in three 
steps, focusing on their behavior as trustees, their actions as trustors and, final-
ly, the learning rule they use to incorporate new information. 
3.1  Agents as Trustees 
The easiest of these components is the agent’s behavior as trustee. Within any 
single trust game, the trustee has no material reason to act cooperatively. To 
                                                             
5  The model is available at <https://www.openabm.org/model/6002/version/1/view> (Accessed 
January 29, 2018). 
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the contrary, the material payoff of exploiting trust is assumed to be strictly 
higher than that of rewarding trust. However, there are various reasons that 
might lead a trustee to act trustworthily. For one, Bicchieri et al. (2011) have 
argued that the behavior as trustee, unlike the trustor’s actions, may be guided 
by a social norm prescribing a reciprocation of trust. Other reasons that could 
motivate trustees to act trustworthily include altruistic traits or a fear of legal 
prosecution. All these factors have in common that they evolve on a much 
larger time scale than the relevant beliefs for deciding whether or not to trust. 
For this simulation, we make the idealizing assumption that each individual’s 
behavior as trustee is constant over time. Each agent can either be trustworthy, 
always playing cooperatively, or untrustworthy, always exploiting trust. To be 
clear: different trustees can follow different strategies; we simply assume that 
each individual agent always sticks to the same strategy throughout a simula-
tion run. Thus, within the strategy tree depicted in Figure 1, the right and left 
side of the tree correspond to trustworthy and untrustworthy trustees. 
3.2  Agents as Trustors 
Agents’ behavior as trustors is guided by the rational choice approach outlined 
above. A trustor is willing to place trust if she expects this on average to be 
advantageous for her. Her behavior thus crucially depends upon her expecta-
tions towards trustees. We model this belief by a parameter, trust expectation, 
ranging from 0 to 1. The higher this value, the higher is the agent’s degree of 
belief that others are, in general, trustworthy. This parameter may thus be in-
terpreted as a subjective belief in the trustworthiness of others. In extreme 
cases, a trust expectation of 0 expresses the belief that trustees would defect for 
sure. A trust expectation of 1, conversely, stands for the belief that trustors are 
univocally trustworthy. So how does this graded belief feed into trustees’ ac-
tions? Following our rational choice approach, agents place trust in others if the 
expected return of doing so is higher than the expected return of not doing so. 
The Harsanyi transformation of the trust game (see Figure 1) reduces this ex-
pected utility calculation to the simple question of how likely it is that the op-
ponent is trustworthy. The higher the chance of being paired with a trustworthy 
agent, the higher the expected payoff of placing trust. Thus, for a boundedly 
rational agent, there will be some threshold of trust expectation from which on 
placing trust becomes the dominant strategy. For this simulation, we set the 
threshold to 0.5. That is, our agents apply the following rule: 
Decision Rule (DR): 
Place trust if trust expectation ≥ 0.5, else do not play.  
Hence, an agent will agree to place trust if her trust expectation exceeds the 
above threshold. In all other cases she will refuse to accept the trustor’s role. 
(DR) 
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3.3  Agents and Learning 
The third part of our model represents the learning mechanism employed by the 
agents. Each agent gradually updates her beliefs about the expected trustwor-
thiness of others. With every trust game played, an agent collects a new piece 
of information I about whether or not it pays off to place trust. Of course, that 
information will impact the agent’s trust expectation and thus her behavior in 
future interaction. We will elaborate shortly about the types of information an 
agent can gain. First, let us describe how any piece of information is incorpo-
rated into the agent’s trust expectation. For our analysis, we assume that freshly 
incoming information is binary: A new piece of evidence indicates that others 
are, in general, trustworthy (I = 1) or not (I = 0). 
This information will then be incorporated into the agent’s prior beliefs by 
way of a weighted average, in line with the paradigm of Bayesian sensor inte-
gration (Körding and Wolpert 2004). Naturally, agents may differ in how much 
weight they are willing to attribute to new information. This difference might 
be caused by personal preferences as well as characteristics of the environment. 
An agent who is uncertain about the value of information already held, for 
instance, may place much weight on new evidence. The same is true vice versa. 
We represent the weight attributed to new information by a sensitivity parame-
ter s. The updated trust expectation is then given by the formula (I): 
ݐݎݑݏݐ	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊௡௘௪ = ሺ1 − ݏሻ ∗ ݐݎݑݏݐ	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊௢௟ௗ + ݏ ∗ ܫ. 
Thus the sensitivity parameter s describes how much weight is attributed to the 
newly received piece of evidence. 
Let us now move from incorporating new information to specifying which 
types of information agents can acquire. There are two different ways in which 
agents can learn about the world. First, when acting as trustor, an agent has 
direct access to a new piece of evidence I about the behavior of trustees: If the 
current trustee cooperates, the trustor receives a positive feedback (I = 1). A 
defecting trustee, on the other hand, triggers a negative feedback (I = 0). How-
ever, there is also an indirect or social way of obtaining information about 
trustworthiness: When assuming the role of a trustee, an agent can observe 
whether or not the corresponding trustor places trust in her. Taking that trustor 
to be a rational agent playing her best strategy, this conveys some indirect or 
social clue about the prospects of trust. A trustor will place trust only if she 
believes that this is a rational thing to do. That is, if she has experienced trus-
tees as predominantly trustworthy. In the baseline model, we treat this indirect 
way of learning on par with the direct information collected as a trustor. Thus 
the possible observations are again I = 1 if the trustor is willing to place trust 
and I = 0 if she refuses to do so. Later, we will inquire further into the subtle 
relationship between these two types of information, direct and social. 
Finally, to conclude this section, we want to emphasize that there is no con-
nection between an agent’s behavior as trustor and trustee. Neither the decision 
(I) 
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rule for when to place trust nor the agent’s updating rule depend in any way 
upon that agent’s behavior as a trustee. And, since the latter behavior is con-
stant throughout time, it is obviously not influenced by her actions as trustor. 
3.4  The Model 
Within the present model, 1,500 agents move and interact on a two-
dimensional grid, thereby gradually forming beliefs about the level of trustwor-
thiness in the surrounding society. In order to prevent small-world effects, 
agents repeatedly interacting with the same partners, we work with a relatively 
large grid of 51 x 51 patches, populated with 1,500 randomly distributed 
agents. To increase homogeneity, agents crossing the right edge of the grid 
reappear at the left edge and vice versa – the same holds for the top and bottom 
edges. Each simulation run lasts for 1,000 rounds. A round consists of a first 
phase in which the agents interact with each other, followed by a second phase 
of moving around. In the interaction phase, agents randomly pick a partner who 
is not yet engaged in any trust game from their immediate vicinity, their von 
Neumann neighborhood. If no such potential partner is available, the agent 
stays unpartnered and does not engage in any trust game for that round. Every 
agent can thus be part of at most one pair at a time, acting as either trustor or 
trustee. After all pairs have played, all agents, including the non-partnered, 
move a fixed distance in a random direction. We will refer to this distance as 
mobility. Each spot can be occupied only by one agent at a time. Agents at-
tempting to move to an already occupied field, repeat the moving routine until 
they find a free spot. After 1,000 rounds, the simulation stops and the final 
measures are extracted.6 
Within the simulation, we systematically varied four input parameters: 
Three of these are the share of trustworthy agents among the population (be-
tween 40 and 70%), agents’ sensitivity towards newly acquired information 
(between 0.03 and 0.1) and the agents’ mobility, the distance each agent moves 
every round (between 1 and 20). Within each simulation run, these values are 
held constant. That is, every agent attributes the same weight to new infor-
mation received and has the same moving speed. Moreover agents never 
change their behavior as trustees. 
The fourth input parameter represents the initial trust expectation at the start 
of the simulation. Here, the input value describes the mean initial trust expecta-
tion of all agents (between 0.4 and 0.8). The individual agent’s trust expecta-
tion is then drawn from a normal distribution around this value with a standard 
deviation of 0.2. We ran a total of 46,080 simulations, two runs for each com-
                                                             
6  There are certain stable configurations that the simulation does not leave once reached. In 
such cases we stopped the simulation early. 
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bination of the four input parameters. Unless noted otherwise, all data present-
ed in the following sections is taken from these simulations. 
4. Results  
In this simulation we are primarily interested in the emergence and stability of 
generalized trust. The question to be answered here is how the level of general-
ized trust depends on a range of individual and societal parameters. To begin 
with, we study the influence of various factors identified as relevant in the 
current literature: Agents’ social and geographical mobility, their initial trust 
endowment, and later the overall amount of trustworthiness present within a 
society. We complement our results by studying how the agents’ subjective 
perceptions of their surroundings, whether society is stable and their peers are 
well informed, impact the stability of trust. Finally, we inquire into the robust-
ness of trust towards momentary shocks, external events that diminish the 
agents’ propensity to put trust in others. 
4.1  Methodology and First Results 
We are mainly interested in two issues. We want to understand the local dy-
namics of trust over a limited number of rounds and, second, we want to grasp 
an entire system’s limit behavior. There are two main measures we use to ad-
dress these questions. The first is the final level of trust, i.e. the share of agents 
willing to trust others, at the end of a simulation run. Following decision rule 
(DR), these are exactly the agents with a trust expectation of at least 0.5. The 
measure Level of trust, is thus defined as 
ܮ݁ݒ݈݁	݋݂	ݐݎݑݏݐ = ௡௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௔௚௘௡௧௦	௪௜௧௛	௧௥௨௦௧	௘௫௣௘௖௧௔௧௜௢௡ஹ଴.ହ௡௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௔௚௘௡௧௦ 	. 
An immediate finding is that, in the long run, the model always converges 
towards this measure’s extreme values of 0 or 1. Eventually, either all agents 
become trusting or all agents become distrusting. Prima facie, this is not im-
plausible. All agents are interested in the same question: whether the actual 
share of trustworthy agents is high enough to justify placing trust in unknown 
others. One could argue therefore, that all agents should arrive at the same 
results. However, the high degree of uniformity in convergence might come as 
a surprise. Despite their different learning histories, virtually all agents arrive at 
the same attitude. We attribute this partially to the indirect part of our learning 
mechanism, guided by social information. When acting as trustee, agents ob-
serve the corresponding trustor’s behavior. From this, they infer the trustor’s 
informational state and update their beliefs accordingly. Once Level of trust is 
sufficiently close to either 0 or 1, almost all trustors behave in the same way 
and the indirect information received by trustees is so uniformly negative (or 
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positive) that it drives the state of society further towards that extreme. For 
extreme values of the Level of trust, the share of trusting agents in a society 
thus becomes self-enforcing. The two states of universal trust and universal 
distrust can, therefore, be seen as stable behavioral equilibria of the iterated 
learning process about trust within a society. We will call simulation runs that 
arrived at these two stable equilibria trusting and distrusting respectively. 
However, we are not only interested in which equilibria exist, but also in how 
and when the simulation converges to either equilibrium. That is, we want to 
know how often the different simulations converge towards a state of universal 
trust and how that reflects the model’s input parameters. Our second output 
measure, Share trusting, is the share of simulations that converge towards the 
trusting equilibrium. Given a set of simulations S, this output measure is de-
fined by 
ܵℎܽݎ݁	ݐݎݑݏݐ݅݊݃ = ௡௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௧௥௨௦௧௜௡௚	௦௜௠௨௟௔௧௜௢௡௦	௜௡	ௌ௡௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௦௜௠௨௟௔௧௜௢௡௦	௜௡	ௌ . 
It is exactly this study of equilibrium selection and equilibrium convergence 
with which computational models are most helpful. While classic game theo-
retic analysis has little to say about the dynamic processes leading towards the 
different equilibria, this simulation does not only offer a reproduction of the 
game theoretical equilibrium results, but also allows for additional insights into 
the way these equilibria arise. 
4.2  Trust and Mobility 
A first, key result is that agents’ mobility has a strong and unexpected influence 
on the emergence and stability of trust. Within the simulation, mobility denotes 
the number of steps an agent moves after each round of interactions. This dis-
tance is the same for all agents within each simulation run. Low levels of mo-
bility thus represent geographically and socially static societies, while dynamic 
societies correspond to higher mobility levels. As will become clearer later, the 
influence of mobility is most intricate. This parameter acts directly, through 
fostering or impeding the emergence of generalized trust as well as indirectly, 
moderating the role of other parameters and events. The role of mobility will be 
highlighted throughout the different sections of this paper.  
First, we look at the direct influence of mobility, specifically at the relation-
ship between this parameter and the share of simulation runs converging to-
wards the trusting equilibrium. 
As displayed in Figure 2, mobility is positively correlated with the level of 
trust. More specifically, a low mobility of 1 is detrimental to the emergence of 
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trust, while higher levels of mobility do not have any traceable impact.7 Nota-
bly, all data presented here is based on the whole set of 46,080 simulations. 
Each data point in Figure 2 thus is an average over a set of simulation runs for 
the different values of the remaining parameters. The largest mobility influence 
occurs at moderate levels of the initial trust endowment, between 5 and 6. For 
higher or lower values of that parameter, the simulation is already too heavily 
bent towards universal trust or distrust.8 
Figure 2: Effects of Trust and Trustworthiness  
 
The observation that mobility favors the emergence of trust stands in contrast 
to a variety of results from current literature. In recent theories on social capi-
tal, the mobility factor is even believed to have a negative impact on the gen-
eral level of social trust. There, it is argued that social norms and general trust 
tend to be stronger in smaller contexts (Putnam 1995). Mobility is sometimes 
even identified as the central characteristic of modern society responsible for 
the decline of social trust. Thus, it is worth considering the mechanisms driving 
mobility’s influence in the current simulation. To do so, we proceed in two 
steps. First, we show that low mobility is correlated with a clustering of trust-
ing and distrusting agents. As a second step we then argue how such clustering 
can favor the emergence of distrust.  
4.2.1  Mobility and Clustering 
We claim that the observed difference between a mobility of one and higher 
levels of mobility can be traced back to a local clustering effect.  
                                                             
7  Within larger grids, similar but weaker effects can be observed for higher mobility levels of 
2 or 3. Thus, we take this phenomenon to be caused by the interplay of field size and mobil-
ity rather than the latter factor alone. 
8  Similar observations can be made about the share of trustworthy agents present in the simula-
tion. Generally speaking, extreme values of these two parameters determine the outcome of the 
simulation and block the influence of other parameters. 
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Figure 3: Clustering and Mobility 
 
With a mobility of one, local clusters of trust and distrust occur, as illustrated in 
the right half of Figure 3, while higher levels of mobility give rise to a more 
isotropic distribution of trust and distrust. We continue the argument in two 
steps. First we show that the emergence of trust is inversely correlated to the 
existence of local clusters before arguing how a local clustering can contribute 
to the emergence of distrust. To show that clusters primarily occur at a mobility 
of 1 and, much less so, at a mobility of 2, we calculate the index of dissimilari-
ty between trusting and distrusting agents, measuring how unevenly these two 
types are distributed across the entire field. For our current purpose, we meas-
ure dissimilarity with the modified Bray-Curtis Index of Similarity,9 based 
upon a subdivision of the field in 3 x 3 square districts of equal size. The left 
half of Figure 3 displays the index of dissimilarity taken after 50 and 100 simu-
lation rounds for different values of mobility. As claimed before, low mobility 
contributes to a high degree of clustering, especially at the outset of the simula-
tion. Remarkably, this clustering is completely endogenous and not reducible to 
any special variable or mechanism within the model. None of the mechanisms 
included directly fosters a clustering between trusting and distrusting agents. 
                                                             
9  Let M be a map divided into a set I of different sectors and let p and q be two populations 
on that map. For each sector i ∈ I let pi and qi be the number of p and q agents respectively 
living in that sector. Then the modified Bray-Curtis index of similarity between p and q is 
given by ଵଶ ∑ ฬ
୮౟
∑ ୮ౠౠ∈౅
− ୯౟∑ ୯ౠౠ∈౅ ฬ୧∈୍ . Thus, the modified Bray-Curtis index measures the classical 
Bray-Curtis dissimilarity (Bray and Curtis 1957) between the local density functions	 ୮౟∑ ୮ౠౠ∈౅  
and ୯౟∑ ୯ౠౠ∈౅
	.	
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4.2.2  Towards an Explanation of Mobility 
In this section we analyze how a local clustering could favor the emergence of 
distrust. More precisely, we show that clusters of distrust gradually spread out, 
thereby infecting the trusting regions around them. See Figure 3 for an illustra-
tion. The main reason for this is that distrust is more stable than trust, for which 
we identify two related explanations.  
First, we argue that the respective beliefs will be more extreme in distrusting 
clusters than in their trusting counterparts. When trusting and distrusting clus-
ters clash, the distrusting agents will thus be more resilient in their beliefs, 
making it more likely for them to convert others than being converted them-
selves. Once a group of agents has converged into a general state of distrust, 
agents refuse to place any further trust. The only incoming information availa-
ble to such agents is the social information collected as trustees. Within a dis-
trusting cluster this information is uniformly negative, indicating that nobody is 
willing to place any trust. Hence, all information received is negative and the 
general trust expectation within a cluster will, therefore, gradually decline 
towards 0, the absolute minimum. For the same reasons, the social information 
available within a trusting cluster is uniformly positive as all agents are willing 
to place trust. However, unlike in distrusting clusters this is not the only source 
of information. Rather, trusting agents also continue to collect new direct expe-
rience through trusting others. Hence, the uniformly positive social information 
is always accompanied by pieces of direct experience. But the latter will some-
times be positive and sometimes negative, depending on the partner’s trustee 
type. In particular, receiving occasional pieces of negative information, agents 
within the trusting cluster will never converge to the maximal trust expectation 
of 1. The average trust expectation in trusting clusters will, therefore, be less 
extreme than in their distrusting counterparts. This asymmetry affects the inter-
play of trusting and distrusting agents located at the border areas between the 
respective clusters. Being less entrenched in their beliefs, trusting agents are 
less resilient to attitude changes than their distrusting peers. It is more likely 
that a trusting agent becomes distrusting than vice versa, and thus the distrust-
ing cluster gradually grows as agents update. 
A second reason for the stability of distrust is related to agents’ learning 
speed. We will argue that trusting agents update their trust expectation more 
often than distrusting agents. Since every change in trust attitude is preceded by 
some informational change, it is therefore more likely in a given time span that 
a trusting agent will change her mind than a distrusting agent. In general, the 
newly collected information of agents will be mixed, containing negative and 
positive pieces of evidence. This holds especially true at the borders between 
trusting and distrusting clusters, where both direct and indirect information can 
be positive or negative, depending on whether the corresponding partner is 
trustworthy (respectively trusting) or not. It is only through such information 
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that agents can change their trust attitude. However, note that trusting agents 
collect double as much information as distrusting agents in the same time inter-
val. The former collect new information in the roles of trustors and trustees, 
while the latter use only the trustee role to update their beliefs.10 Hence, the 
chance of a trusting agent switching her state in any given time interval is high-
er than the chance of a distrusting agent doing so, simply because the former 
updates her trust expectation twice as often. Thus, within any fixed time span, 
we should expect more trusting agents to become distrusting than vice versa, 
causing the distrusting population to grow gradually. 
4.3  Initial Trust Endowment and the Share of Defecting Agents 
In the next step of analyses, we consider two parameters related to the actual 
trustworthiness of a society: the number of defecting agents and the initial trust 
endowment at the beginning of a simulation run. The latter is an individual 
parameter that reflects an agent’s prior experience or her socialization. Hence, 
different agents will start with different initial trust expectations. In each simu-
lation run, the agent’s initial trust endowment will be drawn from a normally 
distributed random variable with a standard variation of 0.2. The mean of this 
distribution, that is the average initial trust endowment, is one of the input 
parameters of the simulation. The left side of Figure 2 shows the influence of 
mean initial trust expectation on the share of simulations converging towards 
the trusting state. Naturally, an all too low initial trust endowment should ham-
per the emergence of trust.  
If agents are unwilling to place trust even once, they can never collect any 
new information about the level of trustworthiness present, at least not by di-
rect learning. A fortiori, if most agents start with a low trust expectation, the 
indirect information collected will also be overwhelmingly negative, thus rein-
forcing agents’ negative attitude. This reasoning helps to explain the left half of 
Figure 2: Surprisingly, even more is true. For sufficiently high levels of initial 
trust endowment, agents set out to collect new information round after round. 
This new information gradually overwrites whatever initial expectation agents 
start with. Yet, despite collecting new evidence for 1,000 rounds, the initial 
trust endowment still has a strong influence on the emergence of trust. If the 
initial trust endowment is high enough, almost all simulation runs converge 
towards the trusting equilibrium, independent of other parameters’ values (see 
Figure 2). This result is especially striking when contrasted with influence from 
the actual share of trustworthy agents. As could be expected, there is a strong 
                                                             
10  Agents have an equal chance of being the first or second party in a trust game. It is only 
inside such a trust game that distrusting agents prefer to play no trust, preventing them 
from learning the opponent’s attitude. Hence, being distrusting does not increase the 
chance of being picked as trustee. 
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negative correlation between the emergence of universal trust and the share of 
untrustworthy agents, see Figure 2. This influence is, however, much weaker 
than that of the initial trust endowment. The subjective perception of agents at 
the beginning of the simulation has a higher influence on the long term level of 
trust than the actual number of untrustworthy agents. 
4.4 Individual Factors: Self Confidence, Group Expertise and Social 
Learning 
We now turn our attention towards the agents’ personal situation. The general 
level of trust is not only guided by which information agents receive, but also 
how this information is incorporated into their trust expectations. This, in turn 
depends on agents’ attitudes towards their surroundings. If agents perceive 
surroundings to be insecure or quickly changing, they will put much weight on 
their most recent encounters. Additionally, if they have little faith in the 
knowledge or competence of others, they might put less weight on their social 
information and more on direct evidence. Conversely, if agents perceive their 
surroundings to be highly stable, they may put considerably less weight on new 
encounters, treating them as anecdotal cases that should not obstruct the wider 
perspective. If they also gain confidence in their peers’ judgments, they might 
place much emphasis on social information so as to profit from the experience 
of others. Both factors, the relationship between new and old information and 
between direct and social information, have a bearing on the long term dynam-
ics of trust. In other words, the level of trust is influenced by how stable and 
predictable agents perceive their surroundings to be. 
Figure 4: Perception and Social Learning 
 
Our agents acquire their individual levels of trust through an iterated adaptive 
learning process. In this process, each piece of incoming information is incor-
porated into agents’ trust expectations through a weighted average. The weight 
attached to the latest piece of evidence, factor s in formula (I), is the agents’ 
sensitivity towards new information. The higher this factor, the more evidential 
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weight an agent puts on her most recent encounters. This factor reflects agents’ 
attitudes towards their surroundings. In insecure or quickly changing environ-
ments, agents will rely less on their own, previous assessment and factor in 
new information strongly. They will exhibit a high sensitivity to new infor-
mation. Conversely, in static surroundings agents may to a great extent depend 
on their previous knowledge, paying less attention to incoming information. 
Experimental results in social psychology suggest that agents’ sensitivity to 
new information is between 3 and 10%, depending on the characteristics of the 
situation (Bereby-Meyer and Erev 1998). 
Within each simulation run, all agents share the same sensitivity to new in-
formation. That is, all agents agree in their perception of whether the surround-
ing society is changing slowly or rapidly. However, agents’ sensitivity varies 
between different simulation runs. In our simulation, we find a negative rela-
tion between social sensitivity and the probability of a simulation running 
towards the trusting equilibrium. Agents’ perception of a rapidly changing 
society is already detrimental to the emergence of trust. Notably, this influence 
is caused by agents’ learning rule alone. There is no explicit mechanism mak-
ing agents more cautious in dynamic surroundings. Furthermore, we find that 
the negative impact of high sensitivity to new information is especially strong 
when paired with a low mobility. While agents’ mobility has little influence 
when sensitivity is low, a mobility of one combined with a high level of sensi-
tivity radically reduces the long term level of trust. 
The reason for social sensitivity’s influence can be traced back to the 
asymmetry between trusting and distrusting agents. Lower sensitivity makes 
agents less dependent on more recent information and more focused on the 
wider implications of the information collected. Arguably, this focus on the 
bigger picture fosters the creation and stability of trust, as long as there are, in 
fact, enough trustworthy agents. No matter how high the trust expectation 
might be, an unfortunate series of trust-abusing encounters can always move 
agents into a state of distrust from which it is difficult to escape. Through a 
combination of chance and bad luck, every trusting agent can encounter a se-
quence of negative information long enough to thwart her trust. The shorter the 
length of such a ‘behavior flipping’ sequence, the more likely it is to occur and 
hence the easier it is for an agent to lose her trust. But the higher the social 
sensitivity, that is the more weight an agent puts on her most recent encounters, 
the less consecutive negative encounters are needed to destroy the agent’s trust. 
Hence, an increased social sensitivity raises the chance of agents’ encountering 
a trust thwarting sequence of negative encounters. 
In the basic simulation, direct and social information are treated on par. 
Agents attribute the same weight to each piece of evidence, be it collected 
through direct, first order experience or through social learning from the behav-
ior of another trustor. Of course, this need not be the case. If trustors are skepti-
cal about the motivations or competence of others, they may attribute less 
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importance to social information. Conversely, if agents take their peers to be 
well informed, they might rely heavily on social evidence. Since each piece of 
social information reflects an entire history of evidence collected by the respec-
tive trustor, this type of evidence could even be seen as more valuable than a 
single piece of direct information. In short, the weights attributed to direct and 
social information reflects, among other things, agents’ perception of each 
other. The more competent others are taken to be, the higher is the weight 
attributed to social information.  
In a second set of experiments, we are interested in how the balance be-
tween direct and social information impacts the stability of trust. For this, the 
original simulation is augmented with an additional factor controlling the rela-
tionship between direct and social learning. The factor Relative social learning 
denotes how much weight is attached to social information, relative to direct 
information. Formally, this means11  
ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ݏ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ	݈݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ = ௪௘௜௚௛௧	௢௡	௜௡௖௢௠௜௡௚	௦௢௖௜௔௟	௜௡௙௢௥௠௔௧௜௢௡௪௘௜௚௛௧	௢௡	௜௡௖௢௠௜௡௚	ௗ௜௥௘௖௧	௜௡௙௢௥௠௔௧௜௢௡. 
Thus, a relative weight of 0 means that social information is not taken into 
account at all, while a relative weight of 1 indicates that direct and social in-
formation are treated on par. Within each simulation run, all agents share the 
same value of Relative social learning. That is, all agents agree in their subjec-
tive attitudes towards the trustworthiness of others. However, we vary this 
factor between different simulation runs. 
We find that the relative role of direct and social information does influence 
the long term level of trust. The higher the emphasis on social information, the 
more likely a society is to establish and maintain long term trust. In other 
words, agents’ perception of their peers impacts on the level of trust. When 
others are seen as knowledgeable and reliable, a society is more likely to de-
velop and maintain generalized trust. As in the case of social sensitivity, this 
observation is driven by the learning rule alone. 
The reason for this result is that social information always favors the majori-
ty opinion. If most agents are willing to trust others, social information will, on 
average, be positive, pushing agents towards trust. Likewise, if most agents are 
disinclined to trust others, the average indirect information will be negative, 
discouraging receivers from trusting others. Taken together, these considera-
tions suggest that social information always reinforces the current majority 
opinion. Moreover, the higher the emphasis on social information is, the 
stronger will be the influence of the majority opinion. As argued above, simula-
tions starting with a majority of distrusting agents univocally converge to dis-
trust already, so the majoritarian pressure of increased social attention cannot 
                                                             
11  Technically, we have replaced the original updating formula (I) with 
ݐݎݑݏݐ	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊௡௘௪ = ሺ1 − ݏ ∗ ݂ሻ ∗ ݐݎݑݏݐ	݁ݔ݌݁ܿݐܽݐ݅݋݊௢௟ௗ + ݏ ∗ ݂ ∗ ܫ.	 
Here, f is the relative social learning factor. 
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be reflected in the results. Rather, social learning is able to have a measurable 
effect only if the majority of agents start in a trusting state, in which case, so-
cial learning favors the emergence of trust.  
Remarkably, without any social learning, i.e. at a relative weight of 0, all 
simulations univocally converge to a state of universal distrust. If the simula-
tion runs long enough, all agents will, with a probability of 1, eventually have a 
sequence of negative encounters long enough to move them into distrust. But 
once an agent has lost her propensity to trust, she cannot regain this propensity 
as only indirect learning would allow her to do so. Thus, social learning is the 
central driving factor for the emergence and stability of trust. 
The way agents perceive their surroundings impacts on the emergence of 
trust. When peers are seen as knowledgeable and the situation as stable, trust is 
likely to emerge. When agents are wary about the competence of their fellow 
trustors or exposed to changing surroundings, this significantly reduces the 
prospects of trust. However, neither of these two factors impacts on the quanti-
tative interplay between the remaining parameters as presented in the previous 
sections. All qualitative relationships presented hold, irrespective of agents’ 
perception of their surroundings.12 
4.5  The Robustness of Trust 
Finally, we turn our attention to the robustness of trust. How resilient is univer-
sal trust to informational shocks, short term intensive events that significantly 
change agents’ perception of their surroundings? Sometimes agents base their 
expectations about trust on more than their own direct and social information. 
When a prominent event, say a group of fraudsters exploiting innocent citizens, 
makes its round through the media, this will impact on many people’s attitudes 
towards trust. If such an event receives enough coverage, it can easily have a 
strong enough influence to completely reverse some agents’ trust attitudes. Of 
course, the same holds for spreading rumors or running cleverly designed me-
dia campaigns. In line with the literature on informational feedback phenomena 
                                                             
12  To test the validity of our findings, we ran two further samples of 46,080 simulations with 
the same starting parameters as the original simulations, but incorporating two slight varia-
tions. In the first variation, we replaced the assumption that there are no social or geo-
graphical limitations to agents’ mobility by introducing spatial restrictions. While ensuring 
that every position could, in principle, be reached by every agent, spatial restrictions create 
secluded regions with bottle-neck accesses that make it hard to enter or leave these areas. 
The second variation increased the field size by a factor of 16, adjusting the number of 
agents accordingly. Unsurprisingly, both variations display some new results. In the first var-
iation it is no longer true that every simulation converges to universal trust or distrust. Ra-
ther, the different secluded regions each converge to their own, local homogeneous state of 
universal trust or distrust. In the second variation, the detrimental influence of low mobility 
also shows at a mobility level of two. All of the qualitative relationships between the differ-
ent influence factors reported here equally show in both these variations. 
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(Hansen, Hendricks and Rendsvig 2013), we will refer to all these events as 
informational shocks, singular events impacting most agents’ beliefs about 
trust. Notably, informational shocks do not change the actual level of trustwor-
thiness. They merely change agents’ subjective beliefs about the value of trust. 
Figure 5: The Impact of Shocks 
 
In principle, the influence of informational shocks can go in either direction, 
raising or lowering the general perception of trustworthiness. For now, we 
focus our attention on negative shocks, short term events that thwart agents’ 
trust expectations. After 200 rounds of simulation, we let an external shock 
diminish each agent’s trust expectation by a random amount between 0 and 0.5 
points. We then enquire whether or not such a short term intensive shock can 
have a lasting effect on the level of trust. That is, we ask whether or not nega-
tive shocks can convert some high trust scenario close to universal trust into a 
state of universal distrust. As it turns out, universal trust, once attained, is high-
ly robust. The shocks studied in this scenario are rather severe. The maximal 
possible impact of 0.5 suffices to turn even the most optimistic agent into dis-
trust. And of course, most agents will not even have such an optimistic trust 
expectation, as they frequently encounter untrustworthy trustees. Yet, in many 
cases, informational shocks do not impact on the long term behavior of a socie-
ty at all. Figure 5 displays the long term behavior of simulations with shocks. 
As always, final measures were extracted after 1,000 simulation rounds, so 
long after the shock in round 200. The left side of Figure 5 displays the share of 
simulations that, in the long run, converges to the trusting equilibrium. The 
right side of Figure 5 displays by how much shocks impact the long term pro-
spect of trust. More specifically, this graph is the difference between long term 
trust behavior without shocks (Figure 2) and with shocks (right hand side of 
this Figure). As can be seen, it takes a high number of untrustworthy agents, 
more than 40%, for shocks to have any long term impact. 
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Figure 6: Trust Level of Trustworthy and Defecting Agents 
 
Furthermore, it turns out once again that low mobility has a negative influence 
on the robustness of trust. When taking the difference between the number of 
simulations converging towards universal trust with and without shocks, we 
find that mobility creates a strong impact. At a mobility of 1, this difference is 
much larger than for higher values. In other words, not only does low mobility 
impede the emergence of trust, but it also makes trust more vulnerable to short 
term informational shocks. 
4.6  Trust and Trustworthiness, a Puzzle 
We end this result section with an unexpected observation about the relation 
between trust and trustworthiness. Many theoretical frameworks postulate a 
correlation between an agent’s behavior as trustor and trustee. In particular, 
various theoretical accounts (see e.g. Falcone and Castelfranchi 2004) claim 
that increased trust in others fosters one’s own propensity to be trustworthy 
and, vice versa, being trustworthy is correlated with higher expectations to-
wards others. No such mechanism is implemented in the current model. To the 
contrary, each agent’s trustee type is fixed throughout a simulation run while 
her behavior as trustor is guided exclusively by past experience. Furthermore, 
the model does not contain any retaliation mechanism against trust abusers. In 
fact, agents do not remember about their past interaction partners, nor can they 
identify them in any way. Yet, the simulation displays a significant correlation 
between agents’ trustworthiness and their propensity to trust others.  
If the two roles of trustor and trustee are independent of each other, it should 
be as likely as not that the trust expectation of trustworthy agents is higher than 
that of untrustworthy agents. However, as shown in Figure 6 this does not hold 
true. Rather, trustworthy agents have higher levels of trust than their untrust-
worthy peers in far over half of the simulations. The effect is strongest at low 
mobility levels, with trustworthy agents outperforming abusers in up to 75% of 
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all simulations. We conjecture that this is caused by a local echo chamber ef-
fect. Being trustworthy and thereby producing positive feedback to one’s im-
mediate surroundings increases the likelihood of later encountering trusting 
agents when acting as trustee. Thus, being trustworthy can influence the con-
tent of future information, even if no agent engages in any type of personalized 
learning. This conjecture is supported by the observation that the effect is at its 
strongest when local surroundings are relatively stable and echo effects have 
time to pan out. This, of course, is the case when mobility is low. 
5. Conclusion and Outlook 
Generalized trust is a driving factor for the economic and political success of 
societies. Consequentially, the factors and determinants responsible for high 
levels of trust have, to date, been the subject of a vast body of empirical and 
theoretical research. Social theories, however, usually have problems in captur-
ing the procedural character of social life. This is particularly true in the case of 
trust, where Bjørnskov (2007) and Nannestad (2008) remark that a theoretical 
explanation for the dynamics of trust is still lacking. Bjørnskov (2007, 1) even 
goes a step further by stressing that endogeneity plays a crucial role in under-
standing the driving mechanisms of trust. In this paper, we addressed this gap 
by means of a computer simulation. 
It goes without saying that the current simulation abstracts away from vari-
ous real life factors that bear on the emergence of trust. The model, for in-
stance, captures neither that information may travel in social circles nor that 
there may be differences in trustworthiness between high and low mobility 
populations. It is exactly through ignoring such factors, that the model can shed 
light on various subtle factors and mechanisms relevant to the dynamics of 
trust. Our results on the influence of mobility, for instance, suggest that any 
negative correlation between mobility and trust, as is often reported in the 
literature, could be exclusively determined by differences in trustworthiness 
between groups of high and low mobility. We have here provided a variety of 
insights into the interactive, dynamic mechanisms guiding the emergence of 
trust. To obtain the full picture, these need to be combined with other insights 
on the distribution of trustworthiness or in-group dynamics. 
There are three main findings that we want to emphasize: First, we observe 
a close link between the mobility of a society and its long term level of trust. 
Ceteris paribus, immobile societies are much less likely to develop and sustain 
high levels of trust than their more mobile counterparts. Furthermore, low 
mobility also increases long term vulnerability to informational shocks and 
other external influence. Second, agents’ subjective perception also has a bear-
ing on the emergence of trust. When agents trust the judgment of their peers 
and see society as stable, trust is likely to emerge. Conversely if agents per-
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ceive society as quickly changing and their environment as ill-informed, we 
should expect much lower levels of trust. Crucially, these results occur even 
without any inherent bias from agents. It is an unfortunate consequence of 
agents’ learning mechanism that creates a connection between their subjective 
perception of the environment and the emergence of trust. The third core in-
sight is that the long-term trust-level of a society is determined to a large extent 
by its initial trust endowment. In fact, we find that agents’ initial trust assess-
ment, sometimes referred to as cultural heritage, has larger bearing on the dy-
namics of trust than the average level of trustworthiness itself. More generally, 
both widespread trust and distrust, once achieved, are resilient towards a varie-
ty of factors and events. This finding helps to shed light on the observation (see 
Bjørnskov 2007) that societies can sometimes display strong and lasting differ-
ences in their trust level, despite being similar in most of the relevant societal 
and economic determinants of trust. 
On a conceptual level, the simulation highlights that a key for understanding 
the dynamics of trust lies in its informational structure. Concerning direct in-
formation, trust suffers from an inherent informational asymmetry. While trust-
ing agents collect evidence with every new encounter, distrusting agents do not 
have access to such information. This asymmetry structurally favors distrust, as 
new information can always lead agents to revise their beliefs. But agents can 
also collect social information about trust, through observing the behavior of 
others. As documented in a variety of studies, such social learning tends to 
reinforce the majority beliefs and attitudes of groups, be they beneficial or 
detrimental to their members (Hansen et al. 2013). In extreme cases, social 
information can outweigh any other newly incoming information, thus locking 
in societies to states of universal trust or distrust. It is this phenomenon that 
ensures universal trust, once reached, to be relatively stable, both to spontane-
ous mutations and external shocks. But, conversely, reinforcement of distrust 
makes it extremely difficult to regain societal trust once lost. The interplay of 
informational asymmetry and social reinforcement creates complex dynamics 
that drive most of the results here. The interaction between these two is strong-
est at low mobilities, where the agents’ behavior is immediately mirrored back 
to them, through the behavior of their surroundings. Local echo chambers are 
likely to form and expand. If there is any general lesson to be learned here, it is 
the importance of bringing agents back to participate in social life. This does 
not necessary mean that they will have positive experiences and learn to trust. 
But without participation there is not even the slightest chance of becoming 
trusting again. 
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